

SW & Human Errors: Its Applications & Implications


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Tenerife disaster (1977)




SW & Accidents

- SW failure directly leads to hazard
 - E.g., blackout
- Safing SW fails to work
 - E.g., Fires in tunnels or bridges
- **Controlling/monitoring SW fails to detect failure**
 - E.g., monitoring system for lifts, friendly fires or aeroplane disasters



To Err is Human



To Err is Human

Selective Attention Test from Simons & Chabris (1999)



To Err is Human

The "Door" Study from Simons & Levin (1998)



To Err is Human

쉐보레 콜로라도 트럭 (Colorado Chevrolet) 광고
'포커스 그룹 (Focus Groups)' 편


To Err is Human

- The importance of the human being in system dependability
 - human operator errors are the largest single source of failures in many systems
 - human errors are inevitable despite the best training
- we might capture human error behavior in dependability benchmarks
 - how we might build dependable systems that tolerate human error.




Humans cause failures


- Human error is the largest single failure source



Errors occur despite experience

- Training and familiarity can't eliminate errors
 - Mistakes mostly in 1st iterations; rest are slips/mishaps
- System design affects error-susceptibility





What can we do?

- Human error is inevitable, so we can't avoid it
 - If a problem has no solution, it may not be a problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped with over time" — Shimon Peres*
- We must build dependable systems that can cope with human error
 - and even encourage it by supporting trial-and-error
 - Allow operators to learn from their mistakes
- Dependable human-operated systems
 - automation: reducing human involvement
 - SW: self-tuning, no-knobs, adaptive systems, ...
 - HW: auto-sparing, configuration, topology discovery, ...
 - but beware of automation bias!
 - training: increasing familiarity with system
 - training on realistic failure scenarios
 - *avoidance is only a partial solution*
 - some human involvement is unavoidable
 - any involvement provides opportunity for errors




The key to dependability?


- Building tolerance for human error
 - accept inevitability of human involvement and error
 - focus on *recovery*
 - **undo**: the ultimate recovery mechanism?
 - ubiquitous and well-proven in productivity applications
 - familiar model for error recovery
 - enables trial-and-error interaction patterns
 - undo for system maintenance
 - “time-travel” for system state
 - must encompass all hard state, including hardware & network configuration
 - must be flexible, low-overhead, and transparent to end user of system



The key to dependability?



Conclusions



Conclusions

- Task Design – design tasks with working memory capacity in mind
- Equipment Design
 - Minimize perceptual confusions – ease of discrimination
 - E.g., airplane controls that feel like what they do (flaps, wheels)
 - Make consequences of action visible – immediate feedback
 - E.g., preview window in some software programs
 - Lockouts – design to prevent wrong actions
 - E.g., car that will not let you lock door from outside without key
 - Reminders – compensate for memory failures
 - E.g., ATM reminds you to take your card



Conclusions

- Training – provide opportunity for mistakes in training, so can learn from them
 - E.g., Simulation
- Assists and Rules – checklists to follow
 - E.g., Pilot pre-flight checklist
- Error-tolerant systems – system allows for error correction or takes over when operator makes serious error
 - E.g., Undo button



Q&A

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