Executive Summary
The Digital Markets Act (DMA) is an ex-ante regulatory framework designed to curb the
abuse of dominant positions by global Big Tech firms and to promote fair competition within
the European Union. The EU enacted the DMA in full force in March 2024 to address
structural concerns stemming from the absence of large domestic platforms and the growing
dominance of U.S.-based Big Tech companies across software-based platforms and services
—including operating systems (OS), app stores, search, and cloud services. However, beyond
its original goal of regulating gatekeepers, the DMA has produced unintended consequences:
by directly intervening in software architectures and data interfaces through obligations
related to data processing restrictions, interoperability, and advertising transparency, it has
been found to dampen startup entry and weaken investment conditions.
Empirical analysis using startup and investment data shows that industries subject to the
DMA—such as search, social media, and cloud computing—experienced significantly fewer new
firm entries and reduced investment volumes compared to non-regulated sectors.
Immediately following the regulatory shock, heightened investor risk perception further
diminished the attractiveness of DMA-regulated industries, leading to reduced startup entry.
Increased compliance costs, legal uncertainties, and risk-averse responses by Big Tech
collectively contributed to negative spillover effects that may undermine the vitality of
software-based innovation ecosystems. These findings suggest that platform regulation
affects not only large incumbent platforms but also has cascading impacts across the broader
software ecosystem.
In Korea, numerous platform regulation bills have been introduced in the 22nd National
Assembly, yet no consensus has been reached on whether to adopt an ex-ante designation
regime or an ex-post presumption framework, nor on the appropriate scope and intensity of
regulatory obligations. The proposals fall into three categories: (1) competition-oriented bills
that focus on regulating dominant positions; (2) transaction fairness–oriented bills that aim to
improve relationships between platforms and business users; and (3) hybrid models
combining both approaches. Korea thus faces a dual challenge: aligning with global regulatory
trends while safeguarding the innovation capacity and competitiveness of its domestic
platform industry.
While curbing unfair practices remains essential, a balanced regulatory design must
carefully account for the implications of interventions into software technical structures—such
as interoperability, data portability, and app-store openness—on the domestic software
industry and developer ecosystem. In particular, Korean firms are likely to become the direct
subjects of regulatory enforcement, whereas global companies may face attenuated regulatory
pressure depending on the scale of their operations in Korea, raising concerns about potential